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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Case No. 20000720-CA 
vs. 
DEBRA LARECE ARANDA Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from convictions on one count of aggravated burglary, a 
first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (1999); two counts 
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-6-302 (1999), and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, 
a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick presiding.1 
defendant was also convicted on a misdemeanor count of unlawful possession of 
a controlled substance. R. 280-281. Whether intentionally or inadvertently, appellant's 
brief does not include an appeal of her conviction on that count. See Br. Aplt. at 1. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the violent 
propensities and criminal histories of two non-witness co-perpetrators where 
defendant presented no evidence that they compelled her to commit aggravated 
burglary and aggravated robbery? 
Review of evidentiary rulings is usually for abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Eberwein, 2001 UT App 71, 1fl[ 9, 11, 21 P.3d 1139. Defendant, however, has the 
burden of presenting some evidence of an affirmative defense, in this case 
compulsion. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 n.7 (Utah 1982). In other words, 
defendant has "the burden of producing some evidence of the defense" where "no 
evidence in the prosecution's case provides an evidentiary foundation for [the] 
claim." State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1985) (self-defense); see also State 
v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, % 8, 18 P.3d 1123 (self-defense). Whether defendant 
has met that burden is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Knoll, 111 
P.2dat215. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's request 
for a two-hour continuance to find her witness, who had been turned away from the 
courthouse because he was so intoxicated that he could barely walk? 
2 
Review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a continuance is for an 
abuse of discretion. See Seel v. Van der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998); State 
v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). Error is reversible only if 
"sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant in its absence." Seel, 971 P.2d at 926 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302 (1999) 
Utah R. Evid. 404 
Utah R. Evid. 405 
Utah R. Evid. 801 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of aggravated burglary, 
two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and two 
counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. R. 17-21. Defendant 
admitted participation in the incident underlying the aggravated counts, but claimed 
compulsion. R. 359:49-52; 360:41-44. Following a jury trial, defendant was 
convicted on all but the kidnapping counts. R. 280-281, 291-297. Defendant's 
motion for a new trial was subsequently denied, and she timely appealed. R. 308, 
325, 328. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Crime 
Honorio Garcia was on his way to work on May 22, 1999. R. 359:56. His 
wife, Norma Rosales, and their three small children were asleep in their West 
Valley home. Id. at 101, 109. About 8:00 a.m. someone knocked on their door. 
Honorio opened the door and saw two strangers—defendant and a male. Speaking 
English, they asked for someone who did not live at the home. Honorio, whose 
English skills were limited, did not fully understand them. Id. at 56-58. 
The male then indicated that he urgently needed to use the bathroom, and both 
visitors entered the home. Id. at 59-60. The male went into the bathroom. Id. at 
60. Meanwhile, defendant pulled a baggy from her purse, indicating her belief that 
drugs were available at the home. Id. At that moment, the male exited the 
bathroom with a 12 to 14 inch knife, put the knive to Honorio's neck, and told him 
not to move. Id. at 60-61. 
A second male then entered the home and grabbed a kitchen knife.2 Id. at 61-
62. The three visitors asked for money. Id. at 63. The males asked defendant for 
tape, and defendant took duct tape from her purse and gave it to them. Id. at 63-64, 
151. 
2Defendant identified the two males as John Hender and Greg Myers. Myers was 
probably the first male and Hender the second. Inconsistencies between the two versions 
of the crime make it difficult to identify with certainty which male was Hender and which 
was Myers. 
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One of the males held a knife to Honorio's throat while the other began taping 
him. Id. at 65-66. Meanwhile, defendant entered the bedroom where Norma was 
sleeping, awakened her, and asked for money. Id. at 66. Norma, who spoke little 
English, did not understand. Id. at 103. Defendant made a gesture with her right 
hand, snapping her fingers, and repeatedly asked for "[m]oney, money." Id. 
Norma recognized defendant. She had seen her on four or five occasions 
when defendant had sold used clothing at the apartment complex where Honorio 
and Norma lived before moving to this home. Id. at 109-111. 
Defendant told Norma to go out into the living room where the males were 
binding Honorio. The males then bound Norma with tape. Id. at 67-68. 
Meanwhile, defendant ransacked and searched the bedroom. Id. at 68. 
During the ten to twenty minute episode, defendant found and took gold jewelry 
valued at approximately $13,000, about $2400 in cash, and Honorio's watch, 
apparently putting many of the items in her purse. Id. at 70, 113-116. Meanwhile, 
the males were urging her to hurry. Id. at 69. One of the males also asked 
defendant for her phone number. Id. at 70. Honorio, who understood numbers in 
English, memorized it. Id. 
Before leaving, the robbers cut the telephone cords. Id. at 71. On her way 
out, defendant dropped a hundred-dollar bill. Id. at 114. One of the males took the 
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keys to the victims' two vehicles. Id. at 113. Honorio observed defendant and the 
male trying to break into his truck. Id. at 73. 
After they left, Honorio quickly extricated himself from the duct tape and 
called the police on his cellular phone. Id. at 73-74. He gave the police the 
telephone number he had memorized. Id. at 76. 
The police traced the number to a Salt Lake City residence where they 
apprehended defendant later that day. Id. at 153-156. Honorio, who accompanied 
the police, identified her as the female robber. Id. at 157. 
Defendant was driving a vehicle she had purchased that morning for $750.3 
When police asked where she had been that morning, she said she had not been 
anywhere that morning, but had left about an hour and a half before. Id. at 159. 
The police arrested her. Id. at 160. 
In a search incident to the arrest, Officer Paula Lozano found $392 in cash 
and three rings in defendant's pocket. Id. at 160-161. Defendant stated that the 
rings belonged to her children but that she carried them with her, now that her 
children were adults. R. 360:15. Officer Lozano then asked defendant what her 
children's names were. Defendant said she had a child named Jacob. Id. When the 
officer noted the "H" initial on one of the rings, defendant changed her son's name 
to Hajacob and then Hobo. Id. 
3Defendant said she paid $750. Police found a receipt for $600 and a bill of sale 
for $750. R. 359:158; 360:12. 
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Honorio identified the rings as his. R. 359:78. The ring with an "H" 
belonged to one of his children also named Honorio. Id. Honorio also identified as 
his a watch and another ring found in defendant's purse. Id. at 171-172. 
In the center compartment of defendant's purse, Officer Lozano found a 
baggy with a white substance that field-tested positive for cocaine and another 
baggy with a green leafy substance that field-tested positive for marijuana. R. 
360:15-16. 
At the police station, another officer observed a wad of money in defendant's 
pants. Id. at 17-18. He called Officer Lozano, who could see the money in the 
pocket she had already searched and emptied. Id. at 18. She asked defendant where 
the money, $620 in $20 bills, came from. Id. at 18-19. Defendant stated that it had 
been down her pants. Id. at 18. 
Defendant was upset when Officer Lozano took the money from her. 
Defendant stated that it was ironic that she was being accused of robbery in an 
incident involving the robbery of a drug dealer. Id. at 18. She later repeated her 
remark about the irony of the situation, telling Detective Nudd, "You must not want 




Defendant testified that Honorio was a dope dealer from whom she had 
regularly purchased drugs for about a year and a half. R. 360:38, 45. She testified 
to the following version of the incident. Id. at 38-54. 
Defendant bought drugs from Honorio for resale to John Hender. Because 
she was planning to leave the state with her fiance, Terry Pierce, Honorio asked her 
to bring Hender over. Honorio wanted to meet Hender because Hender was the one 
"who [she] made money off." Id. at 38-39. Further, "John was bugging [her]," 
apparently wanting to meet Honorio. Id. at 39. 
She called Honorio early on the morning of the incident asking whether she 
could bring Hender over. Id. Honorio agreed to the meeting. Id. Defendant 
picked up Myers because she "like[d him] more" than she did Hender. Id. at 40. 
When they got to Honorio's, defendant and Myers knocked on the door. 
Hender was doing "something" in the car. Id. at 41. Defendant and Myers entered 
the home. Defendant was explaining to Honorio that he could do business directly 
with Hender when Hender came in and asked Honorio to show him "what kind of 
drugs, what kind of business they would be doing." Id. 
Honorio brought out three bags of dope. Id. Hender then asked for Honorio's 
scales to make sure the drugs "weigh[ed] out." Id. Honorio "hem-haw[ed] around" 
and said the battery in his scale was not working. Id. Hender became agitated, and 
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Honorio tried to back out of any deal, saying he would not do business with Hender. 
Hender then grabbed a knife from the dish drainer, seized Honorio, and said, "I 
think you will." Id. at 42. 
Defendant claimed she asked Hender what he was doing. Hender turned 
around, went "like that" with the knife, and said, "You go find the rest of his drug 
money and stereos and whatever." Id. at 43. Honorio was scared, and defendant 
was scared for him. Id. 
Defendant thought about running out the door, but she was the one that 
"brought these people here." Id. So she went down the hall into the bedroom and 
tried to explain to Norma, "They want money." Id. at 44. Norma did not 
understand. Defendant "didn't want John to come up empty-handed" so she found 
jewelry and stuffed it into her purse. Id. at 44. 
She then left the bedroom, showed Hender and Myers the gold jewelry, and 
encouraged them to get going. Id. at 45-46. She wanted to get them out before 
anyone was hurt. Id. at 45. 
After they left Honorio's home, defendant tried to walk away, but Hender told 
her to get in the car. Id. at 46. The three of them then went to a motel. Defendant 
"rant[ed] and ravfed] at them," asking, "Hell, what the hell did you do that for" and 
"How dare you get me involved in this." Id. at 47. She claimed she then dumped 
everything out of her purse and left. Id. 
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She said she was frantic and afraid the "Mexicans were going to shoot [her]." 
Id. at 50. She had a thousand dollars "travel money" that had come from the sale of 
her fiance's truck. Id. at 48.4 Because she was so frantic and because her car had 
been impounded, she bought another car—the one she was using when 
apprehended. Id. at 50-51. Even though it cost more to buy the new car than to get 
her older car released from impoundment, she "didn't want to mess with getting the 
other one out and wait until Monday and all that. [She] wanted to get gone." Id. at 
51. 
Defendant was apprehended with three rings in her pocket. She claimed they 
must have fallen through to the bottom of her purse. When she was going through 
her purse, she found them and thought she might be able to sell them if she needed 
money, but she lied to the police about the rings because she felt so guilty. Id. at 
51-53.5 
Defendant concluded her testimony: "The way I felt about it was, here, I felt 
like the wetbacks—Honorio and Norma—they didn't even know how lucky they 
were probably that I was there . . . . And I felt like I had done good deed by getting 
[Hender] out of there, even though I was the one that took him there." Id. at 53-54. 
4Officer Lozano testified that defendant said the money was her "tax money," not 
her "truck" or "travel money." R. 359:15, 72. 
5Defendant never asserted that the watch had also fallen through to the bottom of 
her purse. Instead, she stated that it belonged to her fiance. R. 359:68-70, 171-172. 
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Cross Examination 
On cross examination, defendant denied that she had duct tape in her purse. 
She said that she didn't know where the tape came from. Id. at 58. Later, however, 
she said didn't "know why [duct tape] was in [her] purse," but that she had been 
using it to pack. Id. at 64. When asked about Myers's pulling a knife, she stated 
that she was surprised. Id. at 58. "And I looked at him like, Are you in on it, too? 
Oh, Lord." Id. 
Further, when asked on cross examination whether Hender was ever 
threatening when he was pointing his knife toward her, defendant responded, "He 
had Honorio by the shoulder and he had a knife. Then he said, You shut up and go 
find the rest of the dope and the money." Id. at 60. When pressed and asked 
specifically whether Hender had threatened her with harm if she did not go back 
into the bedroom to find the dope and money, defendant answered, "He pointed the 
knife, and I didn't want him to hurt Honorio or the kids." Id. Asked again whether 
he said anything to her when he pointed the knife, defendant said, "He didn't have 
to. I knew not to mess around just by instinct." Id. Asked whether she had heard 
Hender or Myers threaten Honorio and Norma with their lives if they didn't comply, 
defendant answered, "No, I didn't." Id. at 61. 
Defendant further admitted that neither Hender nor Myers had any knowledge 
of the jewelry in the home. Id. at 65. When asked whether she could have taken 
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just the money, but not the jewelry, defendant said, "I figured that was more 
impressive. [Hender] wanted to get dope and money. And I seen this and that 
would be the ticket to get this man out of the house." Id. 
Defendant said that she left all the jewelry with Hender and Myers. When 
asked about the rings (apparently those found in her pant pocket) and the watch and 
the other ring found in her purse, defendant said the rings were the ones that had 
fallen into the bottom of her purse and the watch belonged to her fiance, Terry. Id. 
at 68-69. 
Defendant testified that Hender was "boisterous and "aggressive" and that 
Myer was not trustworthy. R. 360:57. When asked why she would take "these 
scary guys with her" to arrange for their direct purchase of drugs, defendant 
answered, "Money is money, to them wetbacks and to me." Id. at 38, 57. 
Evidentiary Rulings 
First Memorialization for the Record 
During a jury recess following the State's presentation of its case, the 
prosecutor asked for an opportunity to place a matter on the record. He stated his 
belief that defense counsel would "try to elicit through his witnesses, either the 
defendant or [her former boyfriend, William Eaton], the criminal histories of the 
two other suspects in this particular case." R. 360:26. He argued that such 
testimony would be inadmissible under rules 608, 609, and 404, Utah Rules of 
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Evidence. Id. Defense counsel responded that he would not be relying on rules 
608, 609, and 404, but on rule 405(b). Id. at 28. The trial judge made no ruling, 
stating that he would have to hear the matter in context. Id. at 29. 
Cross Examination of Detective Kevin Nudd 
Defendant attempted to introduce evidence concerning the criminal history 
and character of her two co-perpetrators, John Hender and Greg Alan Myers. 
During cross-examination of Detective Kevin Nudd, defense counsel asked whether 
Hender and Myers "ha[d] numerous robberies." R. 359:169. The prosecutor then 
asked for a side-bar conference and objected. See id.; R. 360:78. The trial judge 
sustained his objection. See R. 360:78. 
Direct Examination of William Jay Eaton 
Defendant called her former boyfriend, William Jay Eaton, as a witness. 
R. 360:30. Eaton testified that he was acquainted with Hender and Myers and 
introduced them to defendant. R. 360:31-32. Defense counsel then asked Eaton 
what he knew about them at that time and what he had told defendant about them. 
R. 360:32. The State objected, and the court sustained the State's objections, ruling 
that the testimony would be irrelevant and hearsay. Id. at 32-33. Defense counsel 
protested that the testimony would go "directly to [his] defense." Id. at 32. 
Defense counsel then asked Eaton whether defendant had given him "any 
indication of what she thought of, whether she was afraid of John." Id. at 33. The 
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witness stated that defendant did not like either Hender or Myers, but the witness 
was cut short by a hearsay objection to testimony "as far as what was told to this 
defendant or told to this witness by defendant." Id. Defense counsel protested, 
arguing, "It's my client's statement." Id, The court sustained the prosecutor's 
objection, ruling that the testimony would be hearsay. Id, at 33-34. 
Second Memorialization for the Record 
During a jury recess following the presentation of defendant's case, the trial 
court permitted defense counsel to make a record of the proceedings relevant to the 
excluded testimony. Defense counsel stated that his questions to Detective Nudd 
were intended to elicit testimony that Hender had been imprisoned in two different 
states and that Myers had been imprisoned in three different states for numerous 
burglaries and robberies. R. 360:77. 
The trial court responded that testimony regarding the prior bad acts of non-
witnesses would have tended to confuse the jury and would be "in large part 
irrelevant." Id. at 78. "[F]or the reasons voiced by the State in our previous recess 
incident to this matter, [the court] sustained the objections." Id. 
Defense counsel again reiterated that he had relied on rule 405 because he 
believed that Hender's and Myers's convictions were important to the defense. Id. 
14 
Request for Continuance and Motion for New Trial 
Defendant planned to call her fiance, Terry Pierce, as one of her witnesses. 
Pierce arrived at the courthouse on the day he was scheduled to testify, but security 
staff stopped him at the entrance because he was obviously intoxicated. Id. at 37; 
R. 325-326. He smelled of alcohol and was barely able to walk. Id. He was told to 
leave the courthouse or he would be ticketed. Id. Court bailiffs then notified the 
parties. Id. 
The trial judge allowed defense counsel some time to go downstairs and 
attempt to locate the witness. R. 326. Pierce was no longer in the area of the 
courthouse. Id. Defense counsel then moved for a two hour continuance to attempt 
to locate defendant. Id. The judge denied that request, and trial resumed. Id. 
Defense counsel later placed on the record matters relevant to his continuance 
request. R. 360:75. Defense counsel stated that Pierce would have testified that he 
had purchased drugs from the victims in this case, that he knew how defendant 
acted around Hender and Myers, that he knew something about their plans, and that 
defendant had not helped plan the robbery. Id. at 76. 
After the verdict, defense counsel moved for a new trial arguing that the trial 
court's refusal to permit a continuance denied defendant his right to counsel and a 
fair trial. R. 308. The judge denied the motion, stating that Pierce's condition 
would have necessitated "more than a brief interruption of trial." R. 363:11. He 
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further observed that, given Mr. Pierce's propensities, "one could not assume that he 
would show up on any subsequent occasion in any condition to testify any more so 
than he was the first time around." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant admitted participating in the burglary and robbery, but alleged that 
her participation was compelled. Defendant did not meet her burden to present an 
evidentiary foundation for her claim and was therefore not entitled to a compulsion 
defense. 
Because she was not entitled to the defense, excluded testimony about her co-
perpetrators' violent characters and histories was irrelevant. Even with the excluded 
testimony, defendant would not have carried her burden to produce some evidence 
that she was compelled to participate by a specific threat. Further, viewing the facts 
in a light most favorable to defendant, she was not entitled to the defense because 
(a) she placed herself in a position where coercion was probable and (b) she 
departed from the coercion, i.e., on her own initiative, she committed additional 
criminal acts that were not coerced. The excluded testimony went, at most, to the 
reasonableness of her failure to resist. Because she did not and could not establish 
other essential elements of compulsion, the testimony was irrelevant. 
The excluded testimony was also properly excluded as hearsay. The trial 
judge properly ruled that the testimony was not admissible under Rule 405, Utah 
16 
Rules of Evidence. While defendant argues other grounds for admission on appeal, 
she did not argue them below and, in fact, affirmatively waived at least one of them. 
Further, she does not argue "plain error" or any other exception to the preservation 
rule, and these claims are not properly before this Court. 
Even assuming that error occurred, it was harmless. Defendant was not 
entitled to a compulsion defense. Further, the substance of the excluded testimony 
was presented to the jury through other evidence adduced at trial. Finally, the 
State's case against defendant was overwhelming while defendant's story was 
riddled with inconsistencies. In the context of the case in its entirety, no reasonable 
likelihood exists that absent the claimed errors the result would have been different. 
Defendant's claim that the trial court improperly denied her request for a two-
hour continuance to locate her fiance-witness also fails. Defendant's witness had 
arrived at the courthouse obviously intoxicated, and court security personnel had 
turned him away. Defendant has not demonstrated that she could have found and 
produced her witness in a condition to testify during the continuance requested or, 
for that matter, during any reasonable time. 
Further, defendant has not demonstrated that she was prejudiced by the denial 
of her continuance request. Even with the witness's testimony, defendant would not 
have been entitled to a compulsion defense. Further, the testimony the witness 
might have presented was generally irrelevant and inadmissible. In any event, had a 
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continuance been granted, had defendant produced her witness, had he been in a 
condition to testify, and had he testified as proffered, no reasonable likelihood exists 
of a different outcome. No prejudice ensued, and any error was harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT A REASONABLE BASIS 
TO SUPPORT HER COMPULSION DEFENSE, AND THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED TESTIMONY 
OF HER CO-PERPETRATORS' VIOLENT PROPENSITIES 
Defendant in this case admitted participating in the underlying criminal 
activity, but alleged as an affirmative defense that her participation was compelled. 
Br. Aplt. at 6-7. Defendant did not meet her burden to provide an evidentiary 
foundation for her defense. See Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215. Therefore, as a matter of 
law, she was not entitled to a compulsion defense. 
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of her co-
perpetrators' violent propensities and criminal histories. Br. Aplt. at 14. 
Specifically, she claims that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding as 
irrelevant and hearsay responses at the following junctures: 
• Detective Nudd was asked whether Hender and Myers "ha[d] numerous 
robberies." R. 359:169. 
• William Eaton was asked what he knew about Hender at the time of the 
incident. R. 360:32. 
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• Eaton was asked what he had told defendant about Hender and Myers. Id. 
• Eaton was asked whether defendant had given him any indication that she was 
afraid of Hender. Id. at 33. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court excluded the 
testimony on two primary grounds: (a) relevance and (b) hearsay. The testimony 
was irrelevant because defendant had presented no evidence of compulsion. At 
most, the testimony she sought to adduce would have been relevant to the 
reasonableness of her failure to resist coercion. Further, defendant demonstrated no 
applicable exception to the hearsay rule. 
A. Because defendant presented no evidence on requisite elements of her 
compulsion defense, the excluded evidence—pertinent only to the 
reasonableness of her resistance—was irrelevant. 
1. Defendant did not establish a "specific threat" 
Utah's compulsion defense statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302 (1999) 
states: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed 
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent 
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or 
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not 
have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable to 
a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a 
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress. 
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To avail herself of a compulsion defense under the statute, a defendant must 
present evidence that she was compelled to commit the offense by a threat of 
violence that she could not reasonably have resisted. Case law interpreting this 
statute makes clear that the threat cannot be "indefinite." State v. Harding, 635 
P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1981). Rather, testimony must establish the "specific detail of 
[any] alleged threats" and "it must have been communicated to the defendant that 
[s]he would be subjected to physical force presently." Id. Fear of danger, albeit 
reasonable, is insufficient. See id. at 34-35 (no imminent threat of violence to 
inmate, who had been involved in prison stabbing incident, and was afraid that 
something might "happen"); see also State v. Ott, 763 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah App. 
1988) (in theft context, "defendant must be faced with a specific, imminent threat of 
death or serious bodily injury"); State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1986) (in 
escape context, threat must be specific and "must be at least that which would cause 
substantial bodily injury"). 
In the instant case, defendant argues that her co-perpetrator(s) threatened the 
immediate use of unlawful physical force against her and against the victims and 
that she participated in the incident only because of that threat. The only evidence 
defendant presented or attempted to present regarding this threat was her personal 
testimony.6 
6Neither the exclusion of evidence nor the denial of a continuance, the errors 
claimed on appeal, affected the establishment of a threat. Rather, any testimony that 
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Defendant testified that she was surprised when Hender grabbed a knife from 
the dish drainer and held it to Honorio. When she asked Hender what he was 
doing, he went "like that" with the knife, and said, "You go find the rest of his drug 
money and stereos and whatever." R. 360:43. On cross examination, she said that 
he told her to "shut up and go find the rest of the dope and the money." Id. at 60. 
She testified that she was surprised to find that Myers too was involved, but did not 
testify that he ordered her to do anything, let alone threatened her. Id. at 58.7 
During cross examination about the incident, defendant was asked whether 
Hender had threatened her with harm if she didn't go back to the bedroom to find 
drugs and money. She said, "He didn't have to. I knew not to mess around just by 
instinct." Id. at 60. When asked whether she had heard Hender or Myers threaten 
Honorio and Norma with their lives if they didn't comply, defendant answered, "No, 
I didn't." Id. at 61. 
Defendant did not testify of any threat to her or to the victims that coerced her 
participation. She did testify to a possibly menacing knife gesture and to Hender's 
might have been adduced had the evidence been admitted and had the continuance been 
granted, would—at most—have supported defendant's claims that she did not plan to 
participate and that her failure to resist was reasonable. 
7Defendant did not address the apparent inconsistency arising from her testimony 
that she, not Hender, invited Myers to accompany her to Honorio's home. R. 360:39. 
She stated, "I took Greg with me basically because I don't—I like Greg more than I did 
John." Id. She did not explain the fortuity of her invitation to the very person with 
whom Hender had planned the crime. 
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ordering her to find drugs, money, and stereos in the bedroom. She did testify to 
her fear of Hender and Myers. But she did not testify to any threat that unlawful 
physical force would be immediately used against her or against Honorio or Norma 
if she did not comply. No other evidence or testimony at trial established or even 
hinted at such a threat. 
Having failed to establish the "specific detail of [an] alleged threat[]" 
communicated to her, defendant's compulsion defense fails as a matter of law. 
Harding, 635 P.2d at 35. 
2. Defendant cannot claim compulsion because she intentionally placed 
herself in a situation where it was probable that she would be subjected 
to duress. 
Further, defendant is not entitled to a compulsion defense because she 
"place[d] [herself] in a situation in which it is probable that [she would] be 
subjected to duress." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302(2). Defendant testified that the 
coercion occurred while she was facilitating drug sales, a criminal activity. See 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (1999) (prohibiting "arrange[ment] to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance"). 
Defendant also testified to Hender's volatileness and to her awareness of that 
trait. Defendant testified that Hender was a regular drug user. R. 360:38, 56. She 
said that he would "boss [her] around." Id. at 40. When asked to leave her home, 
Hender would refuse and say, "What are you going to do about it?" Id. She 
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described him as "overbearing," "boisterous," and "aggressive." Id. at 57. She 
stated that the three elderly gentlemen with whom she lived were afraid of him and 
that one of them wanted to testify that "[Hender] was going to shoot at him once." 
Id. at 39-40. 
Drug trading activities are fraught with the potential for violence and 
irrational behavior, including betrayal and compulsion of one-time cohorts. By her 
own admission, defendant was sufficiently acquainted with Hender to know his 
tendencies to aggression and violence and intimidation. Assuming defendant and 
Hender went to Honorio's home to establish a drug conduit, as defendant alleges, 
defendant thereby placed herself in a situation where it was probable that she would 
be subjected to duress. She is therefore not entitled to a compulsion defense. 
3. Even had defendant been coerced into taking money, taking the gold 
jewelry was an independent, uncoerced criminal act, precluding 
establishment of a compulsion defense. 
Under Utah law, a compulsion defense is not available where a defendant is 
coerced to commit one criminal activity, but "depart[s] from the coercion" and 
commits a different criminal activity "of her own choosing." Farrell v. Turner, 482 
P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1971) (compulsion defense unavailable where inmate told 
defendant "to break into jail, get the keys, and unlock the door," but defendant 
instead gave the inmate hacksaw blades so that he could break out). 
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Here, defendant testified that Hender "wanted to get dope and money." 
R. 360:65. She admitted that neither Hender nor Myers knew of the valuable 
jewelry in Norma's room. Id. When asked why she took the jewelry in addition to 
the money, defendant said, "I figured that was more impressive. . . . And I seen this 
and that would be the ticket to get this man out of the house." Id. 
Defendant thus "departed from the coercion" and engaged in an independent 
uncoerced act. Under the facts that she presented—the only facts that might have 
demonstrated compulsion—defendant cannot establish her defense. 
4. Because defendant has not presented a reasonable basis to support her 
compulsion claim, her claims of error are necessarily harmless. 
Viewing all the evidence presented or that might have been presented in a 
light most favorable to defendant, defendant cannot, as a matter of law, establish 
legal compulsion. Defendant's claimed errors are therefore harmless. Had 
defendant been allowed to elicit excluded testimony, the additional testimony would 
not have established a legal basis for a compulsion defense. 
B. Defendant has waived any claims that evidence was improperly excluded 
as hearsay and has not demonstrated an exception to the hearsay rules. 
Defendant claims that the excluded evidence should have been admitted 
because it fell outside the rule 801(c) hearsay definition. Br. Aplt. at 17-22. She 
argues that the testimony would not have been hearsay because it was 
• not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and 
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• offered by the declarant. 
Id. at 22. Defendant did not object on these grounds to the evidentiary rulings 
below and does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances. She has 
therefore waived any claim on these grounds. 
Defendant argued below that the testimony was admissible under rule 405, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court properly ruled that it was not. 
In any event, exclusion of the evidence was harmless. Other testimony 
adduced sufficiently informed the jury that Hender and Myers were dangerous and 
that defendant had reason to fear them. 
1. Defendant has not preserved her claim. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of 
Hender's and Myer's violent characters and criminal histories, evidence she sought 
to admit to establish her compulsion defense. Br. Aplt. at 14. Defendant argues 
that the testimony was admissible pursuant to rule 405(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
cited as authority below. Id.; R. 360:28. She cites no authority for the application 
of rule 405(b) in this context, but does cite authority relying on rules 404(b) and 
801(c). Defendant affirmatively waived reliance on rule 404 below. R. 360:28. 
Further, defendant did not argue the application of rule 801 below. "'Trial counsel 
must state clearly and specifically all grounds for objection.'" State v. Bryant, 965 
P.2d 539, 546 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 
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n.12 (Utah 1993)). Indeed, "[t]he objection must "'be specific enough to give the 
trial court notice of the very error' of which counsel complains.'" Bryant, 965 P.2d 
at 546 (quoting Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co,, 912 P.2d 457, 460 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citation omitted)). Finally, because defendant has argued no exception 
to the preservation rule, her claim that the testimony was admissible under rules 404 
and 801 is waived. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 941 nn.8-9 (Utah 1994); State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 
1141, 1144-1145 (Utah 1989). 
2. The trial court did not err when it excluded character and bad acts 
testimony proffered as admissible under rule 405. 
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excluded testimony of 
Hender's and Myers's criminal history that should have been admitted under rule 
405, Utah Rules of Evidence. The trial court did not err. 
Rule 405 provides: 
(a) In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a 
person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to the reputation or 
by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is 
allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is [an] 
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of 
specific instances of that person's conduct. 
Rule 405 does not "deal with the admissibility of character evidence, which is 
covered in Rule 404"; it "deals only with allowable methods of proving character." 
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Advisory Committee Notes, Fed. R. Evid. 405. In other words, rule 405 does not 
provide grounds for the admission of evidence otherwise excludable, e.g., under 
hearsay or relevance grounds. See Utah R. Evid. 801, 402. 
Further, even if Rule 405(b) were read as a rule governing admissibility where 
the character of a person is an essential element of the crime, defendant could not 
prevail. Defendant apparently argues that Hender's and Myers's violent characters 
constitute an essential element of her compulsion defense. They do not. The 
compulsion defense requires a showing of coercion based on use or threatened 
imminent use of unlawful physical force. The character of the persons making the 
threat, violent or peaceable, is not an element of the defense. See United States v. 
Swanson, 9 F.3d 1354, 1359 (1993) (no authority "requires that a defendant who 
claims coercion as a defense prove that the person who conducted the coercion had 
a violent character"). 
Defendant argues specifically that the trial court erred when it excluded 
Eaton's answer to the question, "Was there anything about John or Greg that you 
told [defendant] about?" Br. Aplt. at 22; R. 360:32-33. Defendant argues that the 
response should have been admitted because it fell outside the definition of hearsay 
found in rule 801(c): "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted." Defendant argues that the testimony was offered, not 
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for proof that Hender and Myers actually committed the acts to which Eaton might 
have testified, but to show that defendant had reason to fear them. Br. Aplt. at 22. 
As explained above, defendant did not make this argument below. She did 
not assert below that the testimony was being offered for this purpose. The judge 
therefore properly viewed the testimony as hearsay and excluded it. 
Defendant also raises for the first time on appeal her claim that Eaton's 
response would not be hearsay by definition because Eaton was the declarant. Br. 
Aplt. at 22. Defendant cites Utah R. Evid. 801(c), emphasizing a portion of the 
rule: '"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." Br. Aplt. at 22. Defendant fails to observe that Eaton did not make the 
excluded statement "while testifying at trial or hearing," as required by the rule. 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded testimony 
about Hender's and Myers's criminal histories and characters. The evidence 
defendant sought to admit was not an essential element of her defense. In any case, 
the trial court ruled that it was not, as required, otherwise admissible, because it was 
hearsay. Defendant did not assert below that the testimony was outside the 
definition of hearsay and cannot now claim error on that ground. 
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C. Error, if any, was harmless. 
If error occurred, it was harmless. In light of the overwhelming evidence 
against defendant, a result more favorable to defendant, absent the error, is not 
reasonably likely. "An erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence . . . cannot 
result in reversible error unless the error is harmful." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 
232, 240 (Utah 1992). An error is harmful only where, "absent the error there is a 
reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993). In evaluating whether an error is harmful, 
the reviewing court must consider the importance of the challenged testimony in 
light of the overall strength of the State's case. See id. 
First, defendant was not, as a matter of law, entitled to a compulsion defense. 
Testimony regarding her co-perpetrators' dangerous characters would not have 
changed that. 
Second, the jury was sufficiently informed of the dangerousness of 
defendant's co-perpetrators by testimony that was admitted. Defendant testified that 
Hender was a regular drug user. R. 360:38, 56. She said that he would "boss [her] 
around" and that when she would ask him to leave her home he would refuse and 
say, "What are you going to do about it?" Id. at 39. She described him as 
"overbearing," "boisterous," and "aggressive." Id. at 57. She stated that the three 
elderly gentlemen with whom she lived were afraid of him and that one of them 
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wanted to testify that "[Hender] was going to shoot at him once." Id. at 39-40. She 
maintained throughout her testimony that fear of Hender compelled her criminal 
activity. 
William Jay Eaton, defendant's former boyfriend, also testified that defendant 
was intimidated by Hender. R. 360:35. In addition, defense counsel elicited 
testimony from Detective Nudd that Hender, who at the time of trial was under 
investigation for participation in this offense, was already incarcerated at the Utah 
State Prison. Id. at 174-175. 
The testimony presented was sufficient to inform the jury that Hender was 
dangerous. Further evidence of his or Myer's violent character or criminal history 
would have been merely cumulative. 
Third, the State's case was overwhelming. Defendant was found in 
possession of a large amount of cash—some in her pocket and some stuffed down 
her pants, a new car purchased that day, and stolen jewelry taken from the victims. 
R. 358:158, 160-161; 360:17-19. When asked about the jewelry, she lied to police, 
saying the rings belonged to her children. R. 360:15. She said her son's name was 
Jacob, but changed the name to Hajacob and then Hobo when she learned that one 
of the rings had an "H" on it. Id. She lied about the watch, saying it belonged to 
her fiance. R. 360:68-69. She told one of the police officers that the money she 
had was her "tax money," but testified later that it was "truck money" or "travel 
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money." R. 360:15, 48, 72. She said nothing of coercion to the investigating 
officers. Further, by her own admission, defendant alone knew the victims. 
R. 360:38-40. By her own admission, she came to the crime scene prepared—with 
duct tape in her purse. R. 360:64. 
Defendant's version of the crime, by contrast, was filled with inconsistencies 
and wholly incredible. For example, defendant testified that 
• Hender and Myers had planned the burglary/robbery without her knowledge 
(but she stated that she, not Hender, invited Myers to come along on the visit 
to Honorio's home), 
• she completely emptied her purse in the motel room (but she acknowledged 
that she possessed various stolen rings, a man's watch, a new car, and $1000 
cash when arrested later in the day), 
she had no duct tape in her purse at the time of the robbery (but she later 
testified that the tape may have been in her purse because she had been 
packing), 
• she knew nothing about the planned crime (but her duct tape testimony 
demonstrated that she was prepared). 
R. 360:39, 40, 47, 58, 64, 68, 69. No reasonable likelihood exists that the result in 
this case would have been different absent the alleged errors. The challenged 
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testimony was of minimal importance in light of the State's overwhelming case. 
Exclusion of the evidence was harmless. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her 
motion for a continuance to locate her witness, Terry Pierce, who had been barred 
from entering the courthouse. Br. Aplt. at 25-26. Pierce allegedly would have 
testified that 
• Honorio and Norma were drug dealers, 
• he and defendant had purchased drugs from them for about a year, 
• he and defendant were planning to leave town, 
• he and defendant had sold his truck for about a thousand dollars and got 
together some other cash, 
• he and defendant were going to introduce Hender and Myers to Honorio so 
that Hender and Myers could purchase drugs directly, 
• he and defendant had purchased drugs from Honorio the evening before the 
robbery, 
• he was arrested later that evening and so was not involved in the robbery 
incident the following morning, 
• he knew of no plan to rob Honorio and Norma, 
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• he had a conversation with Hender where Hender bragged about how 
defendant had not known about the "situation," had been stupid, and had been 
the one arrested, 
• Hender was an imposing individual and defendant was intimidated by him. 
R. 363:5-6. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant has not demonstrated 
that Pierce could actually have been produced within the continuance requested. 
Further, under the facts of this case, any error was non-prejudicial. Pierce 
would not have testified to an imminent threat. Further, his testimony would have 
had no favorable bearing on whether defendant placed herself in a situation where 
duress was probable or whether she departed from the compulsion. Even if the 
excluded testimony may have supported the reasonableness of defendant's failure to 
resist any alleged coercion, it would not, as a matter of law, have entitled defendant 
to a compulsion defense. Error in excluding the evidence, if any, was necessarily 
harmless. 
A. Defendant has not shown that her witness could actually have been 
produced within the continuance requested or that he could have been 
produced within a reasonable time. 
A defendant moving for a continuance to procure the testimony of an absent 
witness "must show that the testimony sought is material and admissible, that the 
witness could actually be produced, that the witness could be produced within a 
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reasonable time, and that due diligence has been exercised before the request for a 
continuance." State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). Further, on 
appeal she must show that she was "materially prejudiced by the court's denial of 
the continuance or that the trial result would have been different had the 
continuance been granted." State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991). 
Here, defendant request a two-hour recess to find Pierce who had appeared at 
the courthouse so intoxicated that he could barely walk. R. 325-326. Court security 
officer Cisneros informed the court that Pierce could not even get through the 
magnetometer. R. 363:9. 
Defendant has not shown that Pierce could actually have been produced 
within the time requested. Had defendant successfully located him, it is unlikely, 
given his inebriation, that defendant would have called him or that he could have 
meaningfully and appropriately responded to questioning. Further, as the trial judge 
concluded, given "Mr. Pierce's propensities, one could not assume that he would 
show up on any subsequent occasion in any condition to testify any more so than he 
was the first time around." R. 363:11. 
B. Defendant has not shown prejudice. 
Defendant has not shown that she was prejudiced by the denial of the 
continuance. First, defendant would probably not have called Pierce in his obvious 
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state of intoxication. Second, no reasonable likelihood exists that Pierce's testimony 
would have changed the result. 
Most of the matters to which Pierce allegedly would have testified would have 
been irrelevant and/or inadmissible. Whether the victims were drugs dealers is 
irrelevant. Whether Pierce knew of a plan to rob the victims is also irrelevant (and 
would likely be offered only to invite speculation that if Pierce did not know, then 
defendant would not have known). 
Further, the trial judge would probably have excluded Pierce's testimony that 
defendant was intimidated by Hender. The trial judge excluded similar testimony by 
other witnesses. 
Of the matters to which Pierce may have testified, those most central to 
defendant's defense would have been (1) an alleged conversation where Hender had 
bragged about how defendant had not known about the "situation," been stupid, and 
got herself arrested, and (2) the alleged sale of his truck for $1000. See R. 363:5-6. 
Defendant does not explain how Hender's statement against interest would 
have been admissible under rule 804(3), Utah Rules of Evidence, which makes 
inadmissible "[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused . . . unless corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." Further, she does not acknowledge 
that Pierce's testimony that he sold his truck for $1000 and got together some 
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additional sum would inadequately explain her possession of $1612 to $1762 cash 
on the day of the crime—$392 (found in the search incident to her arrest), $620 
(found later at the jail), and $600 to $750 paid out for the vehicle she purchased on 
the day of the crime prior to her arrest. See R. 359:158, 160-161; R. 360:12, 17-19. 
In any event, case law requires review of the denial of a continuance in 
context of the case in its entirety. Here, Pierce's testimony would not have 
established compulsion. Further, no reasonable likelihood exists that his testimony 
would have changed the result. Defendant's story was inherently incredible and the 
evidence presented against her was overwhelming. Nothing suggests that the jury 
would have believed Pierce, any more than it believed defendant. See Seel v. Van 
der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah 1998) (no indication, in context of incredible 
case, that jury would have found alibi witness more believable than defendant). 
Assuming the court erred in denying the continuance, error was harmless. See id. 
(when reviewing denial of continuance, court must take into account "the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence against [a defendant] and the general 
incredibility of [her] story"). 
Defendant has demonstrated neither an abuse or discretion nor prejudice based 
on the trial court's denial of her motion for a continuance. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th i s \5_ day of ^ ^Jtkt^L^ • 2001 
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Addendum A 
295 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 76-2-305 
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is authorized, 
solicited, requested, commanded, or undertaken, per-
formed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or 
by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his 
employment and in behalf of the corporation or associa-
tion 1973 
76-2-205. Criminal responsibility of person for con-
duct in name of corporation or association. 
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an 
offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the 
name of or on behalf of a corporation or association to the same 
extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or 
behalf 1973 
PART 3 
DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
76-2-301. Person under fourteen years old not crimi-
nally responsible. 
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct performed 
before he reaches the age of fourteen years This section shall 
in no way limit the jurisdiction of or proceedings before the 
juvenile courts of this state. 1973 
76-2-302. Compulsion. 
( D A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in 
the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the 
use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force 
upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a 
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not have 
resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall 
be unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable 
that he will be subjected to duress. 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the 
presence of her husband, to any presumption of compulsion or 
to any defense of compulsion except as in Subsection (1) 
provided. ISTS 
76-2-303. Entrapment. 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into com-
mitting the offense Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or 
a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer 
induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creat-
ing a substantial n sk that the offense would be committed by 
one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely afford-
ing a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not 
constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when 
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the 
offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct 
causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even 
though the actor denies commission of the conduct charged to 
constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall 
hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of 
fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit 
the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten 
days before trial except the court for good cause shown may 
permit a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was 
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the 
court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue 
may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial \ nv 
order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment 
shall be appealable by the state 
(6) In any heanng before a judge or jury where the defense 
of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant shall 
not be admitted except that in a trial where the defendant 
testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for felonies 
and any testimony given by the defendant at a heanng on 
entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at trial 
76-2-304. Ignorance or mistake of fact o r law. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact 
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any 
prosecution for that crime 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or mean-
ing of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reason-
ably believed his conduct did not constitute an offense 
and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor s 
reasonable reliance upon 
(1) An official statement of the law contained in a 
written order or grant of permission by an adminis-
trative agency charged by law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law in question, or 
(u) A written interpretation of the law contained in 
an opinion of a court of record or made by a public 
servant charged by law with responsibility for inter-
preting the law in question 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law 
may constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may 
nevertheless be convicted of a lesser included offense of which 
he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he believed 
1974 
76-2-304.5. Mistake as to victim's age not a defense . 
(1) It is not a defense to the cnme of child kidnaping, a 
violation of Section 76-5-301 1, rape of a child, a violation of 
Section 76-5-402.1, object rape of a child, a violation of Section 
76-5-402.3, sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section 76-5-
403 1, or sexual abuse of a child, a violation of Section 
76-5-404 1, or aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a violation of 
Subsection 76-5-404 1(3), or an attempt to commit any of those 
offenses, that the actor mistakenly believed the victim to be 14 
years of age or older at the time of the alleged offense or was 
unaware of the victim's true age. 
(2) It is not a defense to the cnme of unlawful sexual 
activity with a minor, a violation of Section 76-5-401, sexual 
abuse of a minor, a violation of Section 76-5-401 1, or an 
attempt to commit either of these offenses, that the actor 
mistakenly believed the victim to be 16 years of age or older at 
the time of the alleged offense or was unaware of the victim s 
true age 1999 
76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a defense — Influ-
ence of alcohol or other substance voluntarily 
consumed — Definition. 
(1) (a) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or 
ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental 
illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of 
the offense charged. 
(b) Mental illness is not otherwise a defense, but may 
be evidence m mitigation of the penalty in a capital felony 
under Section 76-3-207 and may be evidence of special 
mitigation reducing the level of a criminal homicide or 
attempted criminal homicide offense under Section 76-5-
205 5. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefUlness of the victim offered by 
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the 
first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this 
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Provision* 
of this rule apply to character evidence to prove 
conduct, aa distinguished from proof of charac-
ter where character is an essential element of a 
charge, claim or defense. As to the latter, see 
Rule 405(b). See also Advisory Committee Note 
to Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 
47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was compa-
rable. See also State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703 (Utah 
1977) (character evidence as to the character of 
the victim of a homicide was admissible to 
rebut the defendant's contention that the de-
ceased was the aggressor). One significant dif-
ference between this rule and Rule 47, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) is that there is no 
provision for the use of character evidence in 
civil cases, except where character is the ulti-
mate issue in question, whereas Rule 47 autho-
rized the use of character evidence in cml cases 
not only on the ultimate issue but where other-
wise substantively relevant See Boyce, Char-
acter Evidence: The Substantive Use, 4 Utah 
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as 
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination 
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct In cases in which character or a trait of 
character of a person is essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof 
may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is consistent 
with Rule 46, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
and the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Cf. State v. Howard, 544 P 2d 466 (Utah 1975). 
Rule 47, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971^ appears 
to be covered by subdivisions taXl) or ib; of 
Rule 404. 
Croat-References. — Slander, truth as de-
fense, § 76-9-508. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Character trait in issue. 
Specific instances of conduct. 
Testimony as to reputation. 
Victim's reputation. 
Cited. 
Character trait in issue. 
Defendant's general reputation for honesty 
and veracity are not in issue on a charge of 
sexual abuse. State v. Sisneros, 561 P.2d 1339 
(Utah 1978). 
Since evidence of character is not an essen-
tial element of sexual abuse of a child, proof 
cannot be made under Subdivision (b); proof 
must be made under Subdivision (a) by testi-
mony as to reputation or in the form of an 
opinion. State v. Lenaburg, 781 P.2d 432 (Utah 
1989). 
Specific instances of conduct. 
Since a defendant's character is not an ele-
ment of the crime of sexual abuse of a child, a 
court does not err in denying the request by a 
defendant charged with such crime for admis-
sion of past instances of conduct relating to his 
"reputation for sexual morality.'' State v. Miller, 
709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1986). 
Testimony as to reputation. 
The accepted procedure in eliciting testimony 
of one's reputation as it pertains to his charac-
ter or a trait of his character that is in issue u 
to first qualify the witness by determining if he 
is acquainted with the reputation of the persox 
in question, and if so, then to have him relat* 
what that reputation is. State v Goodliffe, 571 
P2d 1288 (Utah 1978). 
Witness' individual opinion is inadmissible a 
evidence of person's reputation. State < 
Goodlifle, 578 R2d 1288 (Utah 1978) 
Victim's reputation. 
In rape prosecution, where evidence she* 
that the association between the parties can 
about in a sociable and peaceable manner and 
transition to violence is claimed, there is 
genuine and critical issue as to consent so th 
the probative value of the victim's reputation 
to moral character outweighs the negative fa 
tors and justifies admission of evidence as 
her reputation. State v. Howard, 544 P2d 4< 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in State v. Speer, 750 P2d 186 (Ut 
1988); State v. Alonzo, 932 P2d 606 (Utah ( 
App. 1997), afiTd, 973 P2d 975 (Utah 1998). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah LAW Review. — Rape Victim Confron-
tation — 1986, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 3, 687. 
Note, Enhancing Penalties by Admitting 
"Bad Character" Evidence During the G\ 
Phase of Criminal Trials — State v. Bish 
1989 Utah L. Rev. 1013. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article-
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the oerson £ E ^ £ „ . 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" i3 a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the deciara 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
the matter asserted. °^  
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or heart* 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the sta^ 
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness demo. 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with th 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied char*! 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, o 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent The statement is offered against a pa^ 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a represent^  
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption 
or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's 
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection 
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). 
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay 
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices 
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of 
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the 
same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). 
Subdivision (dXl) is similar to Rule 63(1), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from 
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior 
statements as substantive evidence if (1) incon-
sistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and 
does not require the prior statement to have 
been given under oath or subject to perjury. The 
former Utah rules admitted such statements as 
an exception to the hearsay rule. See California 
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with respect to 
confrontation problems under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Subdivision (dXl) is as originally promulgated 
by the United States Supreme Court with the 
addition of the language "or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten" 
and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and 
the actual effect on most juries. 
Subdivision (dXIXB) is in substance the 
same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its 
interpretation of the applicable rule in this 
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,310 
P.2d 388 (1957). 
Subdivision (dXIXC) comports with prior 
Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123, 
388 P.2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 
2d 277, 451 R2d 786 (1969). 
The substance of subdivision (dX2XA) was 
contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
Similar provisions to subdivisions (dX2XB) 
and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
Rule 63(9), Utah Rules of Evidence (I97i)t 
was of similar substance and scope to subdivil 
sion (dX2XD), except that Rule 63(9) required 
that the declarant be unavailable before such 
admissions are received. Adoptive and vicari-
ous admissions have been recognized as admis-
sible in criminal as well as civil cases. State v 
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980). 
Statements by a coconspirator of a party 
made during the course and in furtherance of 
the conspiracy, admissible as non-hearsay un-
der subdivision (dX2XE), have traditionally 
been admitted as exceptions to' the hearsay 
rule. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,120 P 2d 285 
(1941). Rule 63(9Xb), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), was broader than this rule in that it 
provided for the admission of statements made 
while the party and declarant were participat-
ing in a plan to commit a cnme or a cml wrong 
if the statement was relevant to the plan or its 
subject matter and made while the plan was in 
existence and before its complete execution or 
other termination. 
Cross-References. — Affidavits admissible 
in hearing on motion, U R.C.R 43(b). 
Affidavits, taking and certification of, § 78-
26-5 et seq. 
Contemporaneous entries and writings of de-
cedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8. 
Depositions and discovery, U R.C.P. 26 et seq. 
Judgment, entry of, U.R.C.P. 58A. 
Judgment roll in criminal case, contents and 
filing, U.R.Cnm.P. 22. 
Marriage certificate, issuance and &li£& 
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12. 
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3. 
U.R.C.P. 44. 
